ABUSE
OF INTELLIGENCE
Redefining
Counter-Terrorism Strategy
Nothing, it has been said, is new under the sun but the
only thing humans have successfully done is to keep off of the
learning game despite the whole projection in education. Terrorism is
not new in human history but what continues to be new is the increase
brutality of conventional military in response. The world has seen
the US embassy bombings in Tanzania and Kenya in 1998 as well as the
Bali bombing in 2002 and several other attacks in India with the
foremost being the Mumbai twin bombings. Russia has several from
Chenchya and in the North Caucusus. That on Israel needs no mention.
With all these, the world learns not. What is the marriage between
conventional military and terrorism? Clearly limited except to tell
the people 'Might is Right.'
If the military is the best panacea for terrorism,
Israel today will be the safest place in the world. The US today
would have gone to bed with all eyes closed after taking on al Qaeda
and the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan but instead these
countries are becoming increasingly insecure. One does not need a
sorcerer or a soothsayer to reveal that conventional military has no
strategic and long term cure for terrorism. The only advantage of
conventional military is on the tactical side. The tactical side must
be backed up by the strategic long-term policies which, based on
historical counter-insurgency measures must encompass both
intelligence and socio-economic revamp. The most crucial fuel of
terrorism is social and economic ostracism. When a people feel they
are not really valued, alienated and trampled upon, they result to
subversion. Perceived oppression begets terrorism.
In case of the current world terrorist activities,
terrorism has largely been associated with religion. It now looks as
if Islam is Terrorism. Action and reaction are equal but opposite.
Going by global events, it is only a locked heart that will fail to
see that Islam has been touched with painful hands by powers of the
world. Power lies West, culture lies East. Power and culture are at
war. Power has shown the world that might is right, culture wants to
prove that all wars are war, either by powerful military force or by
selective killings. To win the war on selective killings known as
terrorism, intelligence must marry root-causes not conventional
military. BUT, the first is for power to check itself. Power needs
real and deep introspection. Power must not blatantly oppress
culture; either its religion or manner of governance. Ironically,
conventional military is the best fuel for terrorism because it makes
the terrorists defiant and turns people's hearts to them. It is a
case of choosing the known devil than the coming angel.
The strategy of terrorism is a semblance of simultaneous
attacks from several directions (SWARM). A good question is: How can
conventional military fight these acts in all directions? Almost
impossible. They have no uniforms, they are readily among the
populace. Some of them are capable of even watching an after-blast,
in fact, even sample people's comments. Fighting terrorism means the
army or conventional military must create the swarm units to swarm
the terrorists. This has cogently been elusive in modern military
strategy on counter-terrorism. Terrorism cannot be fought with large
mass of troops. Terrorists cannot be defeated with powerful and
massive military firepower. Civilian casualties is what this brings.
The only thing this can and will do is to alienate the population the
more thereby creating more and more fertile grounds for the
terrorists. Tactical success no matter how blossoming can be locked
by strategic failure. Japan today would have been an indirect enemy
of the United States after the American occupation if her economy and
leaders are corrupt like Afghanistan and Karzai.. Swarms of attacks
would have wearied out the US in Tokyo a long time ago.
The
only way to counter terrorism is to combine intelligence and
long-term strategy of winning the hearts of the people through the
destruction of all insurgents gasoline (reasons for insurgency). The
ember of annoyance and ill-feelings must be logically extinguished.
Every terrorist cell has reasons for actions, both remote and
immediate. Intelligence brings out these causes while strategy
gradually eliminates them one after the other. Religion-influenced
terrorism is on the highest scale today. Terrorists easily relapse to
religious dogmatism to gain converts and spread tentacles.
Identification of the rationale for the attack(s) must be the first
mission. Rather than wage war on the people or show a strong
antagonism of their religious belief and doctrine, a consciously
sustained campaign of what the religion really stands for and truly
preaches should be sought from well-meaning clerics and must be
publicly revealed as well as generally debated. First strategy. This
will be the foundation of intelligence gathering.
In state-sponsored terrorism, the first strategy should
also be rationale identification. After this, the government of the
attacked state must be ready to launch swarms of secret missions on
the brains behind the cell(s) within the attacking state circles. A
perfect illustration is the death of nuclear scientists in Iran. Be
that as it may, government over the years have not learn anything
worthwhile owing to the numerous superfluous firepower usually
employed. The US failed in Vietnam, USSR failed in Afghanistan. The
US is again failing in Iraq and Afghanistan. Russia is failing in the
North Caucusus and Nigeria is failing in Borno and the Northeastern
States. Kenya cannot close her eyes because of al Shabab. ECOWAS
could also be preparing to fail in Mali if it employs massive
firepower and makes the rebels turn to swarm tactics using cells.
BRIEF
LESSON FROM HISTORY
From 1948, Britain was combated with the Malaya
Revolutionary Liberation Army (MRLA) insurgents mainly composed of
99% Chinese and few Malays as well as Indians. The insurgents had
drawn a map of a three-stage Marxist revolution. The first attack
came in June, 1948. Britain wasted no time in reacting. It was swift,
ferocious, good co-ordination and excellent perseverance. Major I A
Nass says ' Britain remained an outstanding model of success of
regular armed forces fighting low-intensity internal insurgency.'
Major Daniel S. Challis, writing in the United State of America
Command and General Staff College (USCGSC) journal said that 'no
better example demonstrates how properly trained forces, committed to
a clear strategic objective, can engage seasoned guerrillas on their
own turf and win'. British and Malay troops numbered about 60,000
police and later 40,000 Home Guards. To decisively swarm the
guerrillas, another private army of Payan Kampong Guards reaching
over 20,000 joined the fight.
The approach of Britain was a combination of economic,
social, political, psychological and military means. All these were
merged into civil action programmes and combat action activities
which were resource intensive, requiring long time planning and
co-ordination. Real patience. There was no quick-fix approach which
Nigeria is employing in the case of Boko Haram. Military operations
were brought under police and civilian (political) control at all
levels. There was tough curfew enforcement, amnesty was granted to
communist insurgents who freely surrendered and there was a
nation-wide registration system. All these made the work of the
rebels difficult. Registration in particular made it cumbersome for
the insurgents to mix freely with the population. Realising the root
causes of the insurgency from assessment of the situation, the
British embarked on programmes aimed at addressing the fundamental
social, economic, psychological and political issues. All these
contributed to the demise of the insurgents as they became brutal in
response and alienated the people from themselves.
NO
LESSON LEARNED
Numerous wars have been fought after that of Britain in
Malaya against guerrillas and terrorists with no lessons learned. The
most catastrophic are the ongoing ones in Afghanistan, Iraq,
Pakistan, Yemen not excluding Somalia. Nigeria has double to deal
with, Boko Haram in the North and Tuareg rebels of Mali in the Sahel.
Nigeria's counter-terrorist measures though not sophisticated tend to
mirror and tilt towards that of the US. In fact, US is her role model
in all ways but good governance and value of citizens' lives as well
as sound economy. Even Sri Lanka was able to decisively ward off the
Tamil Sea Tigers rebels when the Sri Lankan Navy shifted to light
fleet and swift vessels attacking the Sea Tigers from all angles
(given the war back to them the way it was coming). More so, the
government was also perfecting its political arsenal as well. It was
sharpening its governance polemics to win the people's hearts
especially after being accused of human rights violations. The US
fought al Shabab in Somalia and the Taliban in Afghanistan without
good knowledge of the terrain and with no strategy of winning the
hearts of the people. Such blunder she committed too in Iraq. Exactly
what Nigeria is committing now in Borno and the Northeastern part and
ECOWAS might likely commit in Mali.
The only lesson we have learned from history is that we
have not learned anything. Not until when nations learn to study the
background rationales for terrorism and come up with broad long-term
plans and counter-terrorism strategy based on more police actions and
intelligence gathering will terrorism subside. The whole affair now
is that with all the mammoth military force being employed and
deployed, terrorism is on the rise because the people are terrorised
in mostly two fronts (militia-terrorism and military-terrorism). The
likely result of this is for the people to accept the 'un-uniformed'
ones who are likely to eat and sleep with and around them. They will
continue to choose the devil than the deep blue sea unless the sea
presents a smiling face and reduce aggression to the barest minimum.
Until they realise and know the sea will not swallow and drown them
before they can decide to swim in it.
