Piracy in Africa: The End of a New Beginning

Maritime insecurity in Africa, particularly in connection with acts of piracy, has constituted an important field of study for security researchers in recent years.

It has also frequently made local and global media headlines. Despite this trend, the focus in recent reports is starting to shift away from alarm towards detailing the diminishing threat of piracy around Somalia. Large-scale pirate activities there appear to be on the wane, but in what ways can we reasonably expect 2013 to be different from the past, in East Africa and elsewhere?

So far in 2013 the most notable event has been the increase in piracy incidents off the West African coast, particularly in the Gulf of Guinea. This continues the trend in 2012 noted by the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) where, despite a sizeable drop in the number of attacks in East Africa from 237 in 2011 to 75 in 2012, a total of 58 incidents were recorded in attacks off the West African coast in 2012, compared to 49 in 2011.

Increased naval patrols and capacity and the adoption of lessons and practices suitable to passage through these sea lanes and areas can account for the drop in attacks and might prompt hopes that piracy will eventually pose an insignificant security threat.

However, the attacks off West Africa differ from East African incidents mainly due to one factor - violent criminal acts are now connected with the movement of oil. The most recent attack took place off Côte d'Ivoire on 21 January 2013 when a large oil tanker named ITRI was hijacked, also demonstrating that the problem is not geographically limited to the Gulf of Guinea.

Crews in such cases are often assaulted while illegal oil bunkering occurs - a practice whereby the ship is drained of oil, which is subsequently spirited back to shore and either sold or refined.

This could result in oil spills, particularly around the already ravaged Niger delta. Offshore oil platforms, often seen as a means of avoiding land-based political instability, are now potential targets and frequently beyond immediate aid. Terrorist attacks on vulnerable installations could also occur, further prompting increases in the number of operations in partnership with the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM).

Many of these acts will be reported as being criminal rather than piratical, as they do not all occur in international waters but rather within the sovereign borders of states, which are set at 12 nautical miles offshore, and are thus subject to countries' own laws and legal systems, rather than being subject to international law as is commonly the case off Somalia.

Meanwhile, that of Nigeria is gradually gathering international attention though it is still largely localised. If the menace is not check appropriately, West Africa might degenerate into another Somalia just as the Islamists are allowed fertile grounds.

Israeli Airstrike aims at Weakening Syria's Military Research: A call for Hezbollah

Though Israel has not yet claimed responsibility for an airstrike targeting a military site near Damascus, experts believe that Tel Aviv aimed to further destabilize Syria and undermine its military capabilities.

Initial reports suggested that Israel conducted an airstrike on a convoy carrying sophisticated weapons that was preparing to cross the Syria-Lebanon border. Israeli officials said the vehicles may have contained chemical weapons and Russian-made anti-aircraft missiles intended for Hezbollah in Lebanon.

“This episode boils down to a warning by Israel to Syria and Hezbollah not to engage in the transfer of sensitive weapons,” a regional security source told Reuters.

But the latest reports from Syria suggest that the airstrike hit the Jamraya research center in the suburbs of Damascus, far from the Lebanese border. An anonymous diplomatic source told Reuters that chemical weapons may be stored at the center, and that the vehicles in Hezbollah convoy were unlikely to be carrying such arms.

Israeli officials have not commented on the airstrike, but the assault may have revealed Tel Aviv’s plans, experts believe. After months of sustained rebel assaults on Syrian air defense systems and bases, the Israeli airstrike follows a pattern of other recent attempts to undermine Syria’s military capabilities.

Israeli officials have frequently expressed fears that Syrian President Bashar Assad will lose control of the country’s chemical weapons stockpiles. But Dr. Ali Mohamad, editor-in-chief of the Syria Tribune news website, believes the fears of chemical weapons was a pretext to destroy Syria's military research centers and ensure that Damascus is unable to produce arms for its military or regional allies.

Syrians know that “this is not at all about chemical weapons,” Dr. Mohamad told RT. “It’s about stopping the Syrian scientists’ military research projects.”

“It finally makes sense because the rebels or as they like to call themselves the revolutionaries, they have been attacking air defense bases near Damascus for the past seven months,” Dr. Mohamad said. “They’ve managed to attack the S-200 base and over four other surface-to-air missile bases.

Now this followed by an airstrike from Israel. So it all adds up, it makes sense. It only shows that Israel has a great interest in the instability in Syria and that it is being helped by groups of armed rebels in Syria.”

“Military research centers are responsible for developing weapons, in particular land-to-land long range missiles,” and Israel wants to stop this research process, Dr. Mohamed explained. “Of course Israel will claim that this is connected to a chemical weapons arsenal, but this is of course not true because nobody stores chemical weapons in a research center.”

“Let’s remember that the Syrian official who was responsible for all military research projects has been assassinated in Damascus by the rebels,” he said. “Let’s also remember that the person who orchestrated the Syrian long-range missile project colonel Dawoud Rajiha was also assassinated in Damascus.

This is about stopping the Syrian scientific military research projects and is about breaking the link that will help [Israel] overcome the Lebanese resistance and the Palestinian resistance.”

Syria will likely retaliate, but not in the form of a direct attack on Israel. Instead, Damascus will seek to arm Hezbollah, the Lebanese resistance, Dr. Mohamed said.

Hezbollah also stated that the attack targeted a Syrian research center and was an attempt to cripple Syrian military capabilities. It declared its full solidarity for Syria’s “leadership, army and people” in a statement.

Russia condemns Israel's attack on Syria

The Russian Foreign Ministry has issued a statement expressing deep concern over Israel’s airstrike on Syria saying that it violates the UN Charter.

The Ministry website says; if this information is confirmed that would mean that we have to deal with unprovoked attacks on the territory of a sovereign state which is inadmissible, whatever objectives are declared as a justification.

Russia has again called upon the international community to stop the violence in Syria, prevent foreign intervention in the conflict, and assist the start of a nationwide dialogue based on the Geneva agreements.

Syrian military command had reported that Israeli aircraft bombed a research facility near the country’s capital Damascus on Wednesday killing two people and wounding five. The statement called the attack a “blatant act of aggression” and blasted Israel for supporting Syrian terrorists.

So far, the Israel has refused to comment, but unnamed sources in the US have told news agencies that the Israeli Air Force did strike a truck convoy on the Syria-Lebanon border that supposedly carried anti-aircraft weapons. Lebanese media has reported a number of air raids conducted by Israel war planes over its territory but said nothing about any strikes.

If confirmed, the air strike will be Israel’s first attack on a Syrian target since 2007 when the Israeli Air Force destroyed what they thought to be an almost complete nuclear reactor in the East of the country, near the border with Iraq. Syria denied the site was a nuclear facility.

Wednesday’s alleged attack would also be Israel’s first direct intervention into the almost-two-year Syrian crisis caused by the standoff between President Bashar Assad and an armed opposition supported by radical Islamists.

Russia has repeatedly called upon the international community to help stop the violence by forcing the opposing sides to negotiation table. Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov says it was the opposition that rejected talks in Syria adding that the crisis would end when the opposition abandons its obsession with ousting Assad, and if this does not happen the fighting will continue and more people will die.

At the same time, Lavrov pointed out that the Russian point of view was that preserving or deposing President Assad’s regime was not a priority. What really mattered, he said, is an immediate stop to the bloodshed and the stabilization of the situation in Syria.

Syria seems to be the last bastion of the Cold War struggle in terms of open support by Russia both in the media and at the UN and fragrant opposition by the US and other Western powers. The second unresolved Cold War dilemma is the Koreas.

Mali and the Burnt Manuscripts : A blow to History, Culture and Civilisation

Despite the claim by archivist that precious manuscripts have been safely moved earlier from Timbuktu to Bamako, some precious artifacts and manuscripts must also have been lost due to the destructive activities of the islamists in Mali.

A building housing over 60 thousand manuscripts from the ancient Muslim world and Greece was set aflame, raising fears of further damage to the country's cultural heritage after months of destruction by Islamists.

Timbuktu mayor Halley Ousmane, who is in Bamako, confirmed the fire at the Ahmed Baba Centre for Documentation and Research, which housed between 60,000 and 100,000 manuscripts, according to Mali's culture ministry.

"I spoke to my media officer this morning. What has happened in Timbuktu is dramatic," he said.

Ousmane said he had also been informed that Islamists had "burnt alive" a resident who had cried out "Vive la France".

The Ahmed Baba institute was set up in 1973. A new building was opened in 2009 following a bilateral agreement with South Africa to promote the conservation, research and promotion of the manuscripts as African heritage.

Italian Prime Minister Mario Monti on Monday indicated Rome was scrapping plans to provide logistical support for French-led forces in Mali due to a failure among the main parties to reach a political deal ahead of elections next month.

"I asked the leaders of the three parties of the majority to give their views but we did not receive the support we had hoped for," Monti, who is himself running as leader of the coalition of centrist parties, said in an interview with La7 television.

Defence Minister Giampaolo Di Paola last week said Italy would send a refuelling plane and two transport planes to carry troops and equipment in the conflict against Islamist-led rebels in Mali.

While expressing Italy's "strong support" for the operation, however, Foreign Minister Giulio Terzi said that "internal political conditions" meant Rome could not offer concrete backing at the moment.

Meanwhile, a spokesman for British Prime Minister David Cameron said on Monday that London was "keen" to contribute more in addition to two transport planes and a surveillance aircraft which have already been provided.

The manuscripts are very crucial to West Africa as well as African civilisation and history. Most of them represent the earliest objective and undiluted accounts and experiences of travellers; most especially Arab traders and Islamic missionaries.

France has so far done the best. The French troops have successfully taken over Kidal, the last stronghold of the Islamists. Reports have it that some of the main leaders of the Islamists have escaped into neighbouring countries especially Nigeria.

U.S Military Trains Coup Plotters

Gen. Carter Ham, the head of the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) has admitted bluntly the failure of U.S. military training to instill respect for human rights in a Malian army now accused of massacring Arabs and Tuaregs as it fights its way north into rebel-held territory. "We didn't spend probably the requisite time focusing on values, ethics, and a military ethos," Ham acknowledged, saying that most U.S. training for the Malians focused on tactics, strategy, and "technical matters."

Since 1985, the United States has sponsored approximately 156 Malian military officers and non-commissioned officers at U.S. professional military schools and given them training focused on professionalizing the military forces. Over the past three years, this funding has reached at least roughly $400,000 annually, and it is possible U.S. intelligence agencies have also funneled in support as well. Sadly, Mali is hardly an isolated case of U.S. military assistance programmes operating with dangerously little oversight and lacking a compelling central rationale.

Though good examples of successful U.S. military training programmes exist but lots of headline cases have gone badly wrong over the years -- from training Indonesian troops that carried out atrocities in East Timor to the billions poured into the Egyptian military to the scores of tainted graduates from the School of the Americas that ran riot in Central America during the 1980s.

In looking at the patterns of U.S. military assistance, the question is not who gets American military aid, but who doesn't. In 2012, the United States delivered bilateral security assistance to 134 countries -- meaning that every country on Earth had about a 75 percent chance of receiving U.S. military aid. Once you weed out places like North Korea and Vatican City, you are pretty much assured of receiving military aid no matter how large or small your country, no matter how democratic or despotic your regime, no matter how lofty or minimal your GDP.

There has been almost zero discussion of how to better focus U.S. military assistance around clear objectives and direct it to countries where it can make a lasting difference. And these aren't insignificant sums when taken together. The administration requested $9.8 billion in security assistance funding for fiscal year 2013.

Much of this military assistance -- through programmes like Foreign Military Financing; International Military Education and Training; Non-proliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programmes; International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; Peacekeeping Operations; and the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund -- is supposed to be overseen by the State Department with the Defense Department doing the heavy lifting of actually delivering aid and training.

The rationale on paper for such assistance is straightforward and usually receives uncritical congressional support. U.S. military aid helps train security forces, finance the purchase of military equipment, bolster the ability of law enforcement to tackle the illegal narcotics trade, and shape cooperation on non-proliferation issues.

But more than anything, the Pentagon has always insisted that spreading military assistance so broadly is all about building relationships with fellow militaries -- a cost effective way of establishing contacts who will pick up the phone in a ministry of defence when needed. For many, U.S. dollars propped up an autocratic military in Egypt, other argue that it was the senior flag relationships between the Pentagon and Cairo that kept the military from opening fire on democratic protesters during the Arab Spring.

But U.S. military aid looks much better on paper than in practice, in large part because it is often delivered as if on autopilot without a reasoned discussion of its merits. The State Department largely offers rubber-stamp approvals, and the Foreign Service currently lacks personnel with the expertise needed to engage in a rigorous debate with the Pentagon about who deserves aid and why.

As Gordon Adams of the Stimson Center has argued, the State Department's "internal capacity to plan, budget, and manage these programmes needs to be seriously strengthened." This, combined with the general tendency of Congress to treat military spending requests as something just short of a papal writ, has meant that U.S. security assistance programmes receive very little oversight.

Equally troubling, military and economic assistance are treated as quite different creatures. For economic assistance, the United States has increasingly insisted that aid recipients at least demonstrate some marginal commitment to democracy and open markets. Not so on the military side, where concerns about corruption, the rule of law, and human rights are treated as something we are too polite to ask about.

Indeed, we probably would offer military training to everyone if it were not for the minor restrictions imposed by Senate Democrats like the Leahy Law, which prohibits U.S. military assistance to known thugs and war criminals that violate human rights with impunity. Yes, having military-to-military contacts through U.S. military training and aid is often useful and can build important relations and lasting trust.

But it is equally true that the list of U.S.-trained officers that have led coups against their sitting governments is a lengthy one in countries ranging from Honduras to Haiti to the Gambia. Contrary to what Ham's remark suggested, a few months spent studying tactics and logistics in Kansas or Georgia rarely seems to slow down a power-hungry colonel when he is hell bent on toppling the elected government that just threatened to cut his budget.

Underwriting security assistance to countries with autocratic leadership or nations that are of little strategic significance doesn't make much sense. U.S. military aid and training should be concentrated in a far fewer countries rather than being sprinkled all around the globe like fairy dust in hopes that good relations result.

Nations should be chosen to receive such military aid and training based on their commitment to reform -- both within the military and within the broader structures of democratic governance, free markets, and respect for human rights. Such aid should be a reward for high-performing countries, not a party favour dispensed at the door.

General Ham sounded genuinely surprised that American-trained officers were up to nefarious deeds. Apparently Ham is not much of a history buff -- a U.S. trained captain led a coup against the government of Mali just last March.

Courtesy: Foreign Policy Analysis

Is Brazil the New China in Africa?

Africa continues to be the home of all powers in the world; emerging or established. After the coming and exploitation of Europe, the United States followed. China is still currently doing hers and now Brazil. African leaders never showed any sign of moving beyond the continent's inverstments beyond its frontiers so as to be a relevant player in the world. All they make her do is accept others to exploit her.

Brazil's role as a trade partner with Africa is increasing, but the political links between the continent and Brazil may prove more important. In December, senior representatives of the Chinese and Brazilian foreign ministries met in Beijing for what was billed the 'second China-Brazil consultation on African affairs'.

They claimed to have expanded their consensus on Africa issues. It is understandably tempting to draw parallels between China and Brazil's economic and political engagement in Africa, and both have generated much speculations. But how similar are the two emerging powers' interactions with the continent?

While Brazil is often held up as the 'new China', the two countries have very different motivations for their presence in Africa. Unlike China, Brazil is relatively self-sufficient in terms of natural resources, and as a result Brasilia has not pushed the Chinese model of large-scale resource-backed infrastructure deals.

As far as Brazil's exports are concerned, Africa has nowhere near the strategic importance of markets in China, the US, or even Argentina. As such, it seems that Brazil's relationship with Africa has thus far been predominantly political rather than commercial.

Since the first term of former president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-10), the Brazilian government has strengthened its diplomatic ties across Africa.

After taking office, Lula quickly doubled the budget of the Itamaraty (Brazil's foreign ministry), leading to a concerted expansion of embassies in developing countries in general, especially in Africa. Brazil now has 37 embassies on the continent - more than the UK, a former colonial power. Between them, Lula and his foreign minister Celso Amorim visited Africa 80 times between 2003 and 2008.

Furthermore, Brasilia often invokes its historical, social, linguistic, and cultural links with Africa as a means to position itself as a 'natural' partner. Lula often spoke of an "historic debt" that Brazil owes to Africa, a reference to the historical exchanges between Africa and Brasil in terms of culture, traditions and people (Brazil is home to more people of African descent than any other country outside Africa).

Although domestic rather than foreign policy appears to be the priority of the current President, Dilma Rousseff, she has continued to chart a similar course. Notably, she has talked of a shared experience of colonialism and last year spoke of building a relationship with Africa entirely free of the "colonial practices that devastated my continent and the African continent, free of all the colonial hells that we lived".

There are clear links between these two parts of the world, but promoting them is also a diplomatic exercise. Such overtures towards Africa fit Brazil's more general policy of presenting an image of being a benign and neutral leader among developing countries.

This strategy is cogently designed with the objective of giving Brazil more projection in multilateral forums such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO), and of achieving the government's long-standing ambition to securing a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.

Alongside the political push, trade between the two regions has grown in total value over the last ten years, covering a wide range of sectors including oil and gas, fertilisers, beef, agricultural produce, minerals and automobiles. However, data from 2010 shows that Africa still only accounts for 5.3% of Brazil's total trade, a percentage that has decreased steadily since 2007, while trade with Asia has increased.

Nevertheless, while Brazil's strategy is political in emphasis, Brazilian businesses have often been central to the government's outreach programme. Lula and Rousseff have both fiercely advocated the formation of 'national champions': Brazilian conglomerates that expand the country's clout abroad and that aim to become worldwide market leaders.

To this end, the Brazilian state, via the Brazilian Development Bank(BNDES), often supports its private companies' African investments, taking advantage of its financial strength as a means to demonstrate Brazil's increasing global prominence. In Africa, Brazil's major construction and extractive firms - such as Petrobras, Vale and Odebrecht - have led the way in terms of investment and sales volume.

And while Brazilian investment in Africa remains a fraction of China's, investment value grew from $69 billion to $214 billion between 2001 and 2009. There have been particularly large investments in Lusophone Africa, often facilitated by credit offered to Brazilian companies by the BNDES: in Angola, BNDES credit has reached $3.2 billion. Notably, while Chinese policy banks such as the

China Exim Bank typically provide finance direct to African governments, the BNDES supports the expansions of Brasilian firms rather than foreign administrations. Further, Brazilian firms have often had to negotiate conflicting pressures from Brasilia: to promote Brasil abroad, but also to prioritise domestic investment and job creation in a time of diminished growth.

This is in contrast to Chinese policy whereby in the past decade, Chinese state-owned enterprises have often been charged with a mandate to aggressively expand at all costs in Africa. Brazil's expansion has been more cautious.

Brazilian investment in Africa is likely to continue in coming years. But as more investors inevitably make decisions in Africa on the basis of private interest and commercial returns, Brasilia may find it difficult to protect its national brand.

Private actors with differing agendas are becoming ever more visible, and there is a risk that this will undermine Brazil's political project of portraying itself as a partner which always prioritises mutual benefit in a spirit of co-operation and equality.