Russia and the United States: No Common Ground

                                                    'The fear of Putin.......'

It seems that US-Russian relations are in a state of pure noises and mere words full of repetitions and sounds and the only option left for the leaders of both countries is to behave like provincial actors repeating a meaningless jumble of words.

The security conference in Munich over the weekend provided a convincing demonstration of this. Both US Vice President Joseph Biden and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov tried to put a positive face on things by emphasizing the New START, cooperation on Afghanistan and Russia's accession to the World Trade Organization, but their words left no doubt that the two countries are at loggerheads and that attempts to break the impasse will be the main focus of US-Russian relations for a long time to come.

No matter how many vague and evasive statements officials might make, it is obvious that US-Russian relations have hit what is probably their lowest point in the past 20 years. Congress passed the Magnitsky Act, which the Kremlin considers an infringement on Russian sovereignty. For its part, in the span of just a few months Moscow evicted USAID, announced its withdrawal from the Nunn-Lugar program, prohibited individuals with US citizenship from holding leadership positions in Russian nongovernmental organizations and banned US citizens from adopting Russian orphans.

On the surface, it would seem that Washington is so frightened by the erratic behavior of President Vladimir Putin that it is ready to accept the rules of his new game and play the whipping boy, thereby lending credence to Putin's claim that he is a tough guy who has forced the US to put up with his abuse. After all, Washington is willing to maintain the appearance of decent relations with Moscow because it desperately needs a northern transit route out of Afghanistan.

Many believe that the Obama administration will end up making concessions to Moscow in the next four years. After all, newly appointed Secretary of State John Kerry and likely new Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel have consistently opposed the very type of global interventionism that infuriates the Kremlin. In this situation, it would be logical to assume that Kerry, Hagel and National Security Advisor Thomas Donilon will push Obama to "appease" the Kremlin.

Concessions could take the form of an agreement not to deploy ships equipped with missile-defense interceptors in the Baltic and North seas, thereby relinquishing even the theoretical US ability to intercept Russian nuclear missiles. What's more, the U.S. could announce that it will postpone for an indefinite period the implementation of the fourth stage of deployment of its missile defense system, a stage that will give the US the ability to destroy long-range strategic nuclear missiles.

But even these bold efforts would be in vain because in reality, US missile defense deployments in Europe are just a pretext. The real reason for Putin's discontent with Washington is based in his sincere belief that the Moscow protests against his regime were US-­sponsored. He is convinced that the US State Department is out to stage a color revolution in Russia and deprive him of power.

This creates an obvious impasse. Washington cannot give the one guarantee that is most important for the Kremlin — that there will not be any more mass protests — for the simple reason that the State Department and CIA have no control over Russia's street demonstrations.

The Obama administration has recognized the futility of trying to appease Putin. For example, the US announced that it was withdrawing from the Civil Society Working Group of the US-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission. Deputy Secretary of State Thomas Melia did not mince words, saying the US was withdrawing because "recent steps taken by the Russian government to impose restrictions on civil society … called into serious question whether maintaining that mechanism was either useful or appropriate." In the end, Washington refused to take part in what had become a hypocritical farce.

If the decision to walk away from the civil society working group was linked to the new team in the State Department, then it is a clear sign of a major change in Washington's policy toward Russia. Biden's comments in Munich seem to confirm this. Yes, Russia remains a key player in solving global security issues that are important for Obama, but Biden made it clear that the US has no intention of pretending for the Kremlin's sake that Russia is a democracy. "It's no secret that we have serious differences on issues like Syria, missile defense, NATO enlargement, democracy, human rights. These differences are real," Biden said in Munich.

Washington does not want to pursue its old policy of engagement, which was based on the assumption that by working with Moscow on issues important to both sides, the US would gradually instill democratic values in Russia. This approach has never worked with the Putin regime. In Obama's second term, it seems that the US will treat Russia as it does any other authoritarian government and will express its disapproval when the regime violates the rights of its citizens.

If the first result of that new approach is the withdrawal from the Civil Society Working Group, then eventually the question of Russia's membership in the Group of Eight will be called into question. Last year, Putin ignored the G8 summit in the US, and the day may not be far off when the presidents of the seven leading democratic countries decide they have nothing to discuss with their Russian counterpart.

Is Brazil the New China in Africa?

Africa continues to be the home of all powers in the world; emerging or established. After the coming and exploitation of Europe, the United States followed. China is still currently doing hers and now Brazil. African leaders never showed any sign of moving beyond the continent's inverstments beyond its frontiers so as to be a relevant player in the world. All they make her do is accept others to exploit her.

Brazil's role as a trade partner with Africa is increasing, but the political links between the continent and Brazil may prove more important. In December, senior representatives of the Chinese and Brazilian foreign ministries met in Beijing for what was billed the 'second China-Brazil consultation on African affairs'.

They claimed to have expanded their consensus on Africa issues. It is understandably tempting to draw parallels between China and Brazil's economic and political engagement in Africa, and both have generated much speculations. But how similar are the two emerging powers' interactions with the continent?

While Brazil is often held up as the 'new China', the two countries have very different motivations for their presence in Africa. Unlike China, Brazil is relatively self-sufficient in terms of natural resources, and as a result Brasilia has not pushed the Chinese model of large-scale resource-backed infrastructure deals.

As far as Brazil's exports are concerned, Africa has nowhere near the strategic importance of markets in China, the US, or even Argentina. As such, it seems that Brazil's relationship with Africa has thus far been predominantly political rather than commercial.

Since the first term of former president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-10), the Brazilian government has strengthened its diplomatic ties across Africa.

After taking office, Lula quickly doubled the budget of the Itamaraty (Brazil's foreign ministry), leading to a concerted expansion of embassies in developing countries in general, especially in Africa. Brazil now has 37 embassies on the continent - more than the UK, a former colonial power. Between them, Lula and his foreign minister Celso Amorim visited Africa 80 times between 2003 and 2008.

Furthermore, Brasilia often invokes its historical, social, linguistic, and cultural links with Africa as a means to position itself as a 'natural' partner. Lula often spoke of an "historic debt" that Brazil owes to Africa, a reference to the historical exchanges between Africa and Brasil in terms of culture, traditions and people (Brazil is home to more people of African descent than any other country outside Africa).

Although domestic rather than foreign policy appears to be the priority of the current President, Dilma Rousseff, she has continued to chart a similar course. Notably, she has talked of a shared experience of colonialism and last year spoke of building a relationship with Africa entirely free of the "colonial practices that devastated my continent and the African continent, free of all the colonial hells that we lived".

There are clear links between these two parts of the world, but promoting them is also a diplomatic exercise. Such overtures towards Africa fit Brazil's more general policy of presenting an image of being a benign and neutral leader among developing countries.

This strategy is cogently designed with the objective of giving Brazil more projection in multilateral forums such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO), and of achieving the government's long-standing ambition to securing a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.

Alongside the political push, trade between the two regions has grown in total value over the last ten years, covering a wide range of sectors including oil and gas, fertilisers, beef, agricultural produce, minerals and automobiles. However, data from 2010 shows that Africa still only accounts for 5.3% of Brazil's total trade, a percentage that has decreased steadily since 2007, while trade with Asia has increased.

Nevertheless, while Brazil's strategy is political in emphasis, Brazilian businesses have often been central to the government's outreach programme. Lula and Rousseff have both fiercely advocated the formation of 'national champions': Brazilian conglomerates that expand the country's clout abroad and that aim to become worldwide market leaders.

To this end, the Brazilian state, via the Brazilian Development Bank(BNDES), often supports its private companies' African investments, taking advantage of its financial strength as a means to demonstrate Brazil's increasing global prominence. In Africa, Brazil's major construction and extractive firms - such as Petrobras, Vale and Odebrecht - have led the way in terms of investment and sales volume.

And while Brazilian investment in Africa remains a fraction of China's, investment value grew from $69 billion to $214 billion between 2001 and 2009. There have been particularly large investments in Lusophone Africa, often facilitated by credit offered to Brazilian companies by the BNDES: in Angola, BNDES credit has reached $3.2 billion. Notably, while Chinese policy banks such as the

China Exim Bank typically provide finance direct to African governments, the BNDES supports the expansions of Brasilian firms rather than foreign administrations. Further, Brazilian firms have often had to negotiate conflicting pressures from Brasilia: to promote Brasil abroad, but also to prioritise domestic investment and job creation in a time of diminished growth.

This is in contrast to Chinese policy whereby in the past decade, Chinese state-owned enterprises have often been charged with a mandate to aggressively expand at all costs in Africa. Brazil's expansion has been more cautious.

Brazilian investment in Africa is likely to continue in coming years. But as more investors inevitably make decisions in Africa on the basis of private interest and commercial returns, Brasilia may find it difficult to protect its national brand.

Private actors with differing agendas are becoming ever more visible, and there is a risk that this will undermine Brazil's political project of portraying itself as a partner which always prioritises mutual benefit in a spirit of co-operation and equality.

WTO: In search of a Future

All things tremble in the world as American economy shakes. The latest is the World Trade Organisation, a third tier financial cum economic organisation backing the Brettonwood institutions. The organisation admitted China in 2001 and Russia in 2011. It has controlled the destiny of the economy of most countries especially developing ones mostly in Africa alongside the World Band and IMF. The organisation is now in search of a future. More.